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Abstract
Millions of people willingly expose their lives via Internet technologies every day, and even those who stay off
the Internet find themselves exposed through data breaches. Trillions of private information records flow
through the Internet. Marketers gather personal preferences to coerce shopping behavior, while providers
gather personal information to provide enhanced services. Few users have considered where their information
is going or who has access to it. Even fewer are aware of how decisions made in their own lives expose
significant pieces of information, which can be used to harm the very organizations they are affiliated with by
cyber attackers. While this threat can affect everyone, upper management provides a significantly higher risk
due to their level of access to critical data and finances targeted by cybercrime. Thus, the goal of this work-in-
progress research is to develop and validate a means to measure exposure to social engineering of 100
executives from Fortune 500 companies. This work-in-progress study will include a mixed methods approach
combining an expert panel using the Delphi method, developmental research, and a quantitative data
collection. The expert panel will provide a weighted evaluation instrument, subsequently used to develop an
algorithm that will form the basis for a Social Engineering eXposure Index (SEXI) using publicly available
personal information found on the Internet on these executives, which will help quantify the exposure of each
executive. The collected data will be quantitatively evaluated, analyzed, and presented.
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Comments
Official submission to journal and proceedings.
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INTRODUCTION 
The exposure of personal information on publicly available resources has grown 
exponentially over the last few years (Acquisti, Brandimarte, & Loewenstein, 2015; 
Mitnick & Simon, 2002). The Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) discovered that no one is safe with the public release of personally 
identifiable information (PII) of dozens of people from his email account (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2015; Franceschi-Bicchierai, 2015). Research has shown 
the primary source of information used in social engineering (SE) attacks originates 
with the target or their associates (Heartfield & Loukas, 2016; Junger, Montoya, & 
Overink, 2017; Luo, Brody, Seazzu, & Burd, 2013). Exposure can happen to 
anybody and enacted by anyone from teenagers to foreign government actors 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016; Kopan, 2015). Additionally, studies have 
indicated that efforts to warn users against sharing their personal information may 
result in a significant increase of the undesirable behavior even after adjusting 
privacy settings on social media (Junger et al., 2017; Ku, Chen, & Zhang, 2013; 
Sutanto, Palme, Tan, & Phang, 2013).  
According to Solove (2006), “Exposure involves the exposing to others of 
certain physical and emotional attributes about a person” (p. 533). Meguerdichian, 
Koushanfar, Qu, and Potkonjak (2001) define exposure as “a measure of how well 
an object … can be observed … over a period of time” (p. 139). Publicly available 
technologies facilitate the exponential growth of PII (Acquisti et al., 2015; Mitnick 
& Simon, 2002) comprised of social media and other platforms (Krishnamurthy & 
Wills, 2009; Maynard, Greenwood, Roberts, Windsor, & Bontcheva, 2015). 
Building upon the discussion of open data by Maynard et al. (2015), publicly 
available personal information (PAPI) is defined herein as comprising all publicly 
accessible resources where PII is exposed. The increasingly available PII via PAPI 
provides social engineers with data, allowing them to be more successful (Acquisti 
et al., 2015; Mitnick & Simon, 2002), averaging over $100,000 per incident in 2013 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2015; Mouton, Leenen, & Venter, 2016). 
The research problem that this work-in-progress study will address is the 
proliferation of SE attacks due to PAPI (Heartfield & Loukas, 2016; Maynard et 
al., 2015; Mitnick & Simon, 2002). Studies have shown a significant increase in 
PII exposed via PAPI as well as an overall willingness of Americans to share 
personal content through self-disclosure, social media, Website personalization, 
and other public venues (Acquisti et al., 2015; Boyd & Ellison, 2007; Hong & 
Thong, 2013; Sutanto et al., 2013). Social networking sites, for example, facilitate 
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this exposure by offering ever-increasing areas of information collection and wider 
audiences for exposure (Acquisti et al., 2015; Pew Research Center, 2013). Self-
disclosure is also on the increase even though 64% of Americans have personally 
experienced a data breach (Olmstead & Smith, 2017). Additionally, 68% of 
American adults are using Facebook - an increase of 7% in a single year 
(Greenwood, Perrin, & Duggan, 2016). 
To illustrate the research problem, the SE attack on the CIA Director can serve 
as a case study encapsulating the effect of PAPI concerning a specific individual 
through multiple attack vectors. Franceschi-Bicchierai (2015) describes how high 
school students gathered information concerning the CIA Director from multiple 
websites: 1) the students obtained the name of the Internet Service Provider 2) from 
whom they obtained the CIA Director’s Social Security number 3) used to request 
a password reset on a personal email account with another company 4) allowing the 
students to gain full access to the CIA Director’s personal email account, and 5) 
resulting in the dissemination of the PII of a significant number of CIA agents. 
Kopan (2015) stated that public figures, such as the CIA Director, are targeted for 
SE attacks. Mitnick and Simon (2002) made a darker declaration: any inroad into 
an organization can prove beneficial to the SE agenda.  
Most of the literature generalizes PII as any content that can be used to 
potentially identify an individual (McCallister, Grance, & Scarfone, 2010; 
Schwartz & Solove, 2011). Schwartz and Solove (2011) argued this stance and 
propose two additional personal information privacy categories that specify 
unidentifiable and identifiable personal information. Following the research of 
Schwartz and Solove (2011), this study defines personally distinguishable 
information (PDI) as any information that definitively identifies an individual (i.e., 
images, video, social security number, biometrics) and personally unidentifiable 
information (PUI) as information that cannot identify a specific individual (i.e., age, 
date of birth, gender). Henceforth, PII is understood as any information that has the 
potential of identification, while not falling into the PUI or PDI categories. 
The exponential increase of PDI, PII, and PUI available via PAPI is providing 
the necessary information for successful SE attacks, especially when the target is 
familiar with the presented information (Acquisti et al., 2015; Heartfield & Loukas, 
2016; Neupane, Rahman, Saxena, & Hirshfield, 2015). According to the U.S. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (2015), Business Email Compromise (BEC) 
approached $800 million in losses for approximately 7000 U.S. organizations in 
under two years before August 2015. Additionally, the FBI also logged an increase 
of 270% of BEC cases over the first eight months of 2015 (Federal Bureau of 
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Investigation, 2015). Familiarity, distractions, and sleep-deprivation significantly 
increase the success rate of SE attacks (Heartfield & Loukas, 2016; Neupane et al., 
2015). The growth of BEC, SE, and PAPI indicate that current research 
methodologies may be inadequate (Tetri & Vuorinen, 2013). Thus, additional 
research is warranted to classify and assess social engineering exposure of 
individuals, especially for strategic personnel. 
Theoretical Background 
The privacy chain, defined herein as the flow of PUI/PII/PDI communication 
between two endpoints, appears to have no lack of supply (Mitnick & Simon, 2002; 
Tetri & Vuorinen, 2013) or demand (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012; Jasper, 
2017). Much of personal information originates from people who continue to 
expose themselves via PAPI even though 64% of America adults have experienced 
a data breach incident. The ever-expanding flow of PAPI is a constant threat to 
organizations (Acquisti et al., 2015; Bélanger & Crossler, 2011; Mouton et al., 
2016). Junger et al. (2017) indicated the success of an SE attack is due in large part 
to the availability of personal information. Studies have shown that the number of 
social media consumers is increasing, with 68% of American adults and 79% of all 
global Internet users having Facebook accounts (Greenwood et al., 2016). The SE 
attack of the CIA Director illustrates the significance of PAPI to the successful 
compromise of an email account, which subsequently led to the exposure of the 
personal information of many federal agents (Franceschi-Bicchierai, 2015; Kopan, 
2015). 
 Schwartz and Solove (2011) argued for better categorization of personal 
information to distinguish between PUI, PII, and PDI for legal standing, data 
storage, long-term consideration, as well as perception. Junger et al. (2017) found 
that the way people perceive PII in virtual worlds has a direct connection with their 
mindfulness in the real world. In response to SE threats and the subjectiveness of 
privacy, many organizations implement security policies and awareness training – 
though with limited effectiveness (Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Mouton et al., 2016; 
Schwartz & Solove, 2011; Tetri & Vuorinen, 2013). Current methods are failing to 
protect organizations from the influx of SE attacks, predict potential targets, 
provide insight into potential content, or specify possible attack vectors (Heartfield 
& Loukas, 2016). The relevance of this research is considerable with the 
documented exponential increase of exposure of PII via PAPI. 
 The literature has shown that people tend to ignore or not understand privacy 
policies, appearing unwilling to manage their privacy (Acquisti et al., 2015; Hong 
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& Thong, 2013). These people comprise those employed by organizations to 
enforce security policy and provide a cyber defense (Mouton et al., 2016). In a 
single data breach, one billion user accounts were compromised in late 2016 
(Green, 2017). The impact of this is typically underestimated, even though the 
literature has shown that breached data are often traded in hacker-undergrounds and 
used in multiple SE attacks (Jasper, 2017). With the release of breached data to a 
Website, PII is often transformed into PAPI (Franceschi-Bicchierai, 2015; Kopan, 
2015). Furthermore, the public release of PII often serves as a flow of continual 
information used to mount SE attacks through myriad of vectors (Mouton et al., 
2016; Tetri & Vuorinen, 2013). Given the documented exponential increase in 
exposed PII made available to SE via PAPI, the significance of this work-in-
progress study is substantial. 
Proposed Methodology 
The goal of this developmental research is to develop and validate a Social 
Engineering eXposure Index (SEXI) using publicly available personal information 
(PAPI) to assist in identifying and classifying SE vulnerabilities, as well as assess 
SEXI on 100 top US executives. Using a mixed methods research design it is 
proposed to provide a rating via SEXI indicating the SE exposure a specific 
individual has. The need for this research is demonstrated by Mitnick and Simon 
(2002), McCallister et al. (2010), Schwartz and Solove (2011), Sutanto et al. 
(2013), Tetri and Vuorinen (2013), Heartfield and Loukas (2016), as well as 
Mouton et al. (2016), who acknowledge the risk associated with SE, the inability 
of experts to know what information is available to social engineers, the exponential 
increase of PAPI that can be used to circumvent security methodologies, the low 
amount of available detail of specific SE events, the growth of SE attack vectors, 
as well as the lack of a predictive threat system associated with PUI, PII, and PDI. 
 This work-in-progress study builds upon the work of Tetri and Vuorinen (2013), 
Acquisti et al. (2015), as well as Heartfield and Loukas (2016). Tetri and Vuorinen 
(2013) found the availability of PAPI facilitated SE attacks across a variety of 
vectors. Acquisti et al. (2015) describe the exponential growth of PUI, PII, and PDI 
across social networks – both in quantity and in the number of willing participants. 
Additionally, Tetri and Vuorinen (2013) describe the ineffectiveness of current 
security and research methodologies due to the dearth of specifics for SE attacks 
combined with the tendency for studies and policies to address only a single lens. 
Heartfield and Loukas (2016) called for a formal framework that could be used to 
outline user exposure to SE, while Tetri and Vuorinen (2013) indicated the 
necessity for future research to investigate the composition and origination of 
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successful SE attacks. This work-in-progress research would solicit Subject Matter 
Experts (SMEs) to develop and validate an index of exposure to SE comprised of 
PUI, PII, PDI available via PAPI for 100 top executives.  
 The first specific goal of this research study is to gather the requirements for an 
index of SE exposure using PAPI. The second specific goal of this research study 
is to develop and assess SMEs approved components and weights for SEXI using 
the Delphi approach (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). The third specific goal of this 
research study is to assess and classify the SEXI of 100 individuals based on the 
results. The fourth specific goal of this research study is to assess and statistically 
test for significant mean differences of the SEXI of 100 individuals based on 
demographical indicators of age, gender, income, marital status, estimated worth, 
industry, organizational position, philanthropic contributions, and prior 
military/police experience. The fifth specific goal of this research study is to assess 
the SEXI of a set of executives, then provide a “best practices” for executives to 
reduce their threat vector. The research questions that this study will address are:  
RQ1: What are the requirements for an index of SE exposure using PAPI? 
RQ2: What are the experts’ approved components and weights for SEXI using the 
Delphi expert methodology? 
RQ3: How are 100 individuals assessed and classified by SEXI? 
RQ4: Are there any statistically significant mean differences of SEXI based on 
demographic indicators of age, gender, income, marital status, estimated worth, 
industry, organizational position, philanthropic contributions, and prior 
military/police experience? 
RQ5: Can SEXI assessments provide a set of executives pertinent information by 
which they can reduce their SE threat vector? 
 
 Research indicates that SE attacks are on the increase (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2015) and that their success (Junger et al., 2017) is often predicated 
on the availability of PAPI (Acquisti et al., 2015). Embracing Heartfield and 
Loukas (2016), the development of an exposure index can facilitate the prediction 
of specific SE targets, as well as the vector composition, typically not provided with 
current methodologies. Prior research documents the willingness of people to 
expose their PII (Acquisti et al., 2015; Pew Research Center, 2013, 2015) and the 
subsequent expense of organizations (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2015; 
Mouton et al., 2016). 
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Conclusions and Discussions  
Research indicates that SE attacks are on the increase (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2015) and that their success (Junger et al., 2017) is often predicated 
on the availability of PAPI (Acquisti et al., 2015). Embracing Heartfield and 
Loukas (2016), the development of an exposure index can facilitate the prediction 
of specific SE targets, as well as the vector composition, typically not provided with 
current methodologies. Research effectively documents the willingness of people 
to expose themselves (Acquisti et al., 2015; Pew Research Center, 2013, 2015) and 
the subsequent expense of organizations (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2015; 
Mouton et al., 2016). Thus, the primary aim of this work-in-progress study is the 
development and validation of a SEXI using PAPI to assist in identifying and 
classifying SE exposure. People make up the weakest component of any 
organizational security defense (Mitnick & Simon, 2002), being easily 
compromised and distractible (Neupane et al., 2015), as well as potentially 
possessing a representation of privacy associating their virtual life with their 
physical surroundings (Junger et al., 2017). Organizational efforts to implement 
security policy and conduct training have shown limited effectiveness (Mouton et 
al., 2016) and may inadvertently contribute to the problem as research has shown 
an increase of PII exposure, even after warnings have been issued (Junger et al., 
2017; Wolff, 2016). Prior literature has called for a prediction mechanism for 
potential SE attacks (Heartfield & Loukas, 2016; Mohaisen, Al-Ibrahim, Kamhoua, 
Kwiat, & Njilla, 2017).  
Future Research 
This work-in-progress study describes the research plan to develop a set of 
measures and a single composite index based on criteria identified in the literature. 
The weights of the criteria and composite index are to be developed using a Delphi 
approach with SMEs, followed by the development of the SEXI. Data collection 
and analysis will be performed on 100 executives of US organizations, where 
anonymized data will be analyzed and reported. 
 Future studies are warranted to increase the validity of the SEXI benchmarking 
index. Also, more research is required to expand the sample size, and the use of 
other populations to enhance the generalizability of the measure developed. While 
this work-in-progress study is concentrating on 100 executives of US organizations, 
future research could include other groups of individuals who may be exposed to 
significant SE attacks, such as law enforcement officers, government employees, 
civilian contractors to the government, as well as others who may be a point of 
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contact for proprietary information at various organizations. Moreover, future work 
can assess privacy practices related to social media and personalization, or even a 
longitudinal study on the impact of awareness of these individuals to their SEXI 
benchmarking index value over time and what actions they took to mitigate their 
exposure to SE attacks. Another area of future research can include the selection of 
a population based on demographic indicators (i.e., gender, age, education) to 
determine if there are any significance difference levels of the SEXI benchmarking 
index based on these indicators. Due to the increasing number of SE attacks, future 
research could include assessing the composite SEXI of an organization or sections 
thereof. Additionally, research into the values of the SEXI benchmarking index 
when compared based on culture may provide further insight. 
Limitations 
This work-in-progress study has several limitations. In its current state, the SEXI 
benchmarking index is based on the foundational literature, and the feedback, 
validation, and adjustments are needed from the Delphi approach with SMEs who 
may provide some important adjustments that were not previously reported in 
literature. The second limitation is the set of measures combined to form SEXI. 
Given that cyber attacks and SE attacks in particular are changing over time, the 
SEXI benchmarking index is based on the current SE threat vector, techniques, or 
approaches, while we envision it requiring more adjustments in the future when 
new approaches to SE, social media security and privacy settings, as well as identity 
theft emerge. The third limitation is the reliance on an American group of experts 
for the SME panel to establish the instrument. While it is the limitation of the 
current work-in-progress study, we believe that a broader population of SMEs with 
also more international participation that is well represented around the globe may 
provide more generalizability to the relative weights, criteria, and measures. 
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